ONE of the principal objections voiced before the move to ministerial government related to the power which it was likely to concentrate in the hands of the executive.

For better or for worse, that concern was set to the side when a majority of States Members decided that the greater efficiencies promised by the ministerial system should override concerns about the possible erosion of Island democracy.

In the light of experience – and in the face of limited evidence of massively increased governmental efficiency compared with the old committee system – fears about the dominant influence of the Council of Ministers are now intensifying.

The major force to counterbalance excessive executive power was always intended to be the Scrutiny structure. But although Scrutiny panels have undoubtedly recorded significant achievements and panel members have worked hard in their frequently low-profile role, it is difficult to claim that they have either settled down into a happy pattern of operation or truly imposed restraint on ministers’ considerable freedom to act unilaterally.

A particular problem with the Scrutiny process has been highlighted by Economic Affairs panel chairman Deputy Mike Higgins. He says that panels are prevented from doing their vital work adequately by what he describes as ‘blanket confidentiality’. In other words, scrutineers are too often denied access to information that they require to frame informed opinions and to reach sensible decisions.

Two problems seem to be particularly troublesome. Firstly, panel chairman can be bound by confidentiality after discussions with ministers which prevents them from sharing information with panel members. Secondly, even if only parts of documents are considered too sensitive – in commercial terms or because they include personal information – ministers tend to favour the easy option, which is to impose restrictions on entire reports or sets of data.

Given the faith vested in Scrutiny to provide the much-vaunted checks and balances that were to be such essential features of ministerial government, Deputy Higgins’s charges are very serious. On those grounds alone they demand thorough investigation. It can, however, be argued that scrutiny’s problems run deeper than the information issue.

It was always assumed that our new form of government would evolve as theory was tested in practice. Could it, therefore, be time for Scrutiny itself to be subjected to systematic re-evaluation and revision which could enable it to meet its original terms of reference?